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What does the recession mean for the income distribution?
The fall in UK living standards which is following the recession has been widely
acknowledged but the question of how this is impacting on different groups within society
remains profoundly contentious. Robert Joyce offers an analysis of these changes and
argues that we are seeing significant real decline across the income distribution. 
It is now old news that the UK recently experienced its deepest recession since the
Second World War. A peak-to-trough f all in national income of  7%, f ollowed by
painf ully slow recovery, clearly has consequences f or households’ living standards.
But – more interestingly – when, how, and f or whom?
The timing of  changes in households’ incomes since the onset of  recession has so f ar been very
dif f erent f rom the timing of  changes in GDP. Unemployment rose as the economy contracted, but so
init ially did the real earnings of  those in work, on average. This is perhaps less surprising when one
considers the very low and sharply f alling inf lation of  the time – in large part due to a discretionary f iscal
stimulus measure implemented in response to the recession, namely the temporary cut to the main rate
of  VAT. RPI inf lation was negative throughout much of  2009, implying that real wage reductions would
have required substantial wage cuts in cash terms. And real incomes held up even more strongly during
that period towards the bottom of  the distribution, where benef its and tax credits are important income
sources. There were some discretionary welf are increases, but a crucial f actor was the decline in
inf lation, which temporarily boosts real welf are entit lements since they are f ixed in cash terms in the
short run (some of  this boost was in f act permanent, as RPI- indexed benef its were not cut in cash terms
in April 2010, even though the relevant measure of  RPI inf lation had been negative in 2009).
Inevitably, the pain was delayed rather than avoided. The crash in real incomes began in 2010-11, af ter
the economy had stopped shrinking (f or the time being). The harsh collision of  households with
economic reality in that year at least partly ref lected the unwinding of  f actors that were always going to
be transitory. The end of  the temporary VAT cut contributed to high and rising inf lation, eroding the real
value of  welf are payments and probably making it easier f or f irms to implement real wage cuts. And the
scale of  the damage done to the public f inances meant that, at some point, household incomes would be
hit by a combination of  tax rises and welf are cuts. This began in April 2010 f or the very richest, with the
top marginal income tax rate rising f rom 40% to 50% f or those on more than £150,000 per year and the
personal tax allowance being withdrawn f rom those on more than £100,000 per year; and in January 2011
f or everyone else, with the rise in the main rate of  VAT f rom 17.5% to 20%.
The income f alls occurred across the distribution in 2010-11, but not unif ormly. Right in the middle,
household incomes f ell by 3.1% in real terms – the largest single-year f all f or 29 years. This reduction
was greater than towards the bottom (1.1% at the 10th percentile) and smaller than towards the top
(5.1% at the 90th percentile). The major reason f or this was, in short, that earnings f ell f aster than
welf are entit lements. So income inequality was reduced substantially, though clearly not in the way that
proponents of  greater equality would have wished.
Due to the lag with which data on the household income distribution become available, that’s still the last
of f icial data we have. But we have much more relevant inf ormation. We know f rom other sources what
has been happening to employment patterns, and the earnings of  those in work. And we know the
numerous changes to tax and welf are policy that have already been implemented as the f iscal
consolidation has got underway. There are also f orecasts (around which there is huge uncertainty, of
course) of  how earnings and employment will evolve as we move f urther into the post-recession period,
and the government has set out detailed plans f or personal tax and welf are policy up to the end of  the
parliament. This allows us to say a lot about what has happened to the household income distribution up
to the present and what would happen over the next f ew years if  current macroeconomic f orecasts – or
indeed some specif ied alternative scenarios – are correct. Ongoing modelling work by colleagues and I
attempts to quantif y all this (a short recent presentation of  some work- in-progress is available here).
Over the last two years we expect the data to show f urther substantial real f alls in middle and high
incomes, because we know that the earnings of  workers have generally been rising f ar more slowly than
prices. There is a group of  mostly middle and upper-middle income f amilies who have gained f rom the
signif icant rises in the point at which income tax starts to be paid (particularly two-earner couples, who
gain twice over) without being much af f ected by the cuts to benef its and tax credits (see below). So f or
them the blow would have been cushioned somewhat. But f or those with high earnings, the net impact of
tax changes has generally been to reduce take-home pay even f urther, as rises in the income tax
allowance are more than of f set by rises in National Insurance and real reductions in the point at which
the higher rate income tax kicks in. And the very richest (approximately the top 1%) have been hit
particularly hard, although the lack of  good data on that group, and uncertainty over how their economic
behaviour has changed in response to additional tax rises, makes it harder to be precise about just how
much their net incomes have f allen.
All else equal, large f alls in real earnings would normally mean that higher- income households f are worse
than those on lower incomes, who are more likely to be entit led to state welf are which is by def ault kept
constant in real terms f rom year to year. But we are also seeing a broad-based package of  welf are cuts
being implemented over the current parliament – almost entirely f or the working-age population – as one
signif icant component of  the f iscal t ightening. Inevitably this largely hits those towards the bottom of  the
income distribution (although not exclusively, with the main obvious exception being the withdrawal of
Child Benef it f rom higher- income f amilies f rom next month); and it is particularly af f ecting f amilies with
children, on whom a large chunk of  the working-age welf are budget is spent. This is all true both f or
those out-of -work and f or those in-work with relatively low earnings who receive (mostly) tax credits.
We have yet to update our income projections since last week’s Autumn Statement (or indeed the March
2012 Budget, largely because that changed relatively lit t le in terms of  policy or macroeconomic
f orecasts). But with f urther downward revisions to real earnings growth f orecasts and another £4.4
billion per year of  welf are cuts announced by 2017-18, the outlook f or household incomes has not have
got any better at either end of  the distribution.
Needless to say, huge uncertainty remains. The outlook f or the UK economy has deteriorated
considerably over the last eighteen months, and it may change again. But sensit ivity analysis we have
done suggests that things would have to turn out very much better than currently expected in order f or
real incomes in 2015-16 to be as high as they were in 2007-08. Frankly the most likely reason why that
statement may need revising is that the Of f ice f or National Statistics is (f or good reason) considering
changing the RPI measure of  inf lation that is currently used to compare incomes in real terms over t ime.
But even that would not change the historical record: calculating household incomes in a consistent way
all the way back to 1961, we have not previously seen a period of  more than f ive years when real median
income has not grown.
Putting all this together, the picture we expect to see unf olding is one of  signif icant real declines in
income right across the distribution, but with the drivers of  this pattern varying depending on where
precisely in the distribution you look. As the IFS Director, Paul Johnson, put it af ter the Autumn
Statement: “In that limited and rather unhappy sense most of  us [the working-age population] really are in
this together.”
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